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Performance evaluations
Standard accounting reports provide 
the basis for the majority of incentive 
compensation contracts today. These 
data-driven measurements provide a 
supposedly “objective” evaluation of 
an employee’s performance and thus 
share of the bonus pool. 
 Yet, the inherent flaws of financial 
tools as a measure of performance and 
reward have been widely demonstrated 
in both research and practice. At 
best, these tools offer inaccurate and 
incomplete measures of employee 
performance that fail to take into 
account the influence of external 
factors such as exchange rates or the 
performance of other business units. At 
worst, they encourage a myopic view 
of profit-making and a strong incentive 
for employees to “cook the books”. 
Altruism, fairness and self-sacrifice 
are not words that typically spring 
to mind when we think of the 
managerial motives behind incentive 
compensation decisions. Yet, this is 
precisely what our recent paper In 
Search of Informed Discretion: An 
Experimental Investigation of Fairness 
and Trust Reciprocity reveals. 
 This result has impor tant 
implications. The vast majority of 
companies today rely solely on 
financial instruments as “objective” 
metrics for structuring their incentive 
compensation contracts – a norm 
that has been blamed for creating 
harmful incentives and asymmetrical, 
inaccurate pay-offs. So, could the 
subjective input of managers in fact 
create fairer compensation allocations 
more reflective of performance? 
 However, what’s the alternative? 
One option is to bring more subjective, 
discretionary input from managers into 
the information flow. Discretionary 
bonus pools are good examples of 
how companies are using subjective 
input from managers to counter 
incomplete reports. 
 The theory? That managers 
can subsidise financial reports with 
additional information garnered from 
variance investigations, discussions, 
examination of work documents, and 
other investigative processes, thus 
reaching a compensation decision 
more proportionate to the employee’s 
performance than a standardised 
report could alone.
 Moreover, herein lies the problem. 
Empirical studies from accounting 
literature reveal that managers 
often fail to use their discretion to 
seek out this extra information. 
Informed discretion 
in performance evaluations 
by Marcel van Rinsum
A study into managerial behaviour relative to compensation 
decisions for individual performances reveals that most 
managers are driven by powerful, non-selfish motives that 
include a strong preference for fairness. 
“When employees chose to invest effort in their 
work, it conveyed trust to managers that this 
effort would be recognised and rewarded.”
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Related research has also indicated 
the presence of managerial bias 
towards understating differences in 
employee performance.
 Yet, is this the whole picture? In our 
study, we investigated how managers 
behave when making compensation 
decisions for individual performances 
in a team setting. Specifically, 
we wanted to know how willing 
managers were to obtain the additional 
information that would enable them to 
make a more accurate assessment of 
an individual’s contribution, when this 
information came at a personal cost. 
Potential unfairness 
Our experiment involved analysing 
the behaviour of managers making 
compensation decisions on behalf 
of individual employees operating in 
teams of two. Individuals acting as 
managers were given the results of 
a team’s aggregate performance and 
asked to split the bonus between the 
two team members.
 Each manager was given a sum 
of money and, before making their 
decision, the opportunity to use it on 
learning more about the effort levels 
of each team member (this money 
representing the managers’ time spent 
on a costly information search), or to 
simply make a decision based on the 
team’s aggregate performance and 
keep the endowment for themselves. 
 How interested were the supervisors 
in disentangling these performance 
levels to make more precise 
evaluations? At the extreme ends 
of performance – where the teams 
performed either extremely badly or 
extremely well, most managers felt 
no need to investigate further. This is 
because one can reasonably assume 
that when a team performs extremely 
well, both team members did a good job 
and thus an equal split of the bonus a 
fair distribution of the reward. Likewise, 
if a team performs terribly, the chances 
are high that both team members 
performed poorly.
 But when a team performs at an 
average level, it is impossible to ascertain 
whether both members performed 
equally well, or one very badly and one 
very well. In this context, the aggregate 
performance becomes a very “noisy” 
measure of individual output. 
A need for fairness
In our research, we found that it was 
precisely in these instances that most 
managers elected to find out how much 
each individual contributed and thus 
allocate the bonuses proportionately. In 
other words: the greater the uncertainty 
as to the potential for unfairness, the 
greater the managers’ willingness to 
incur personal cost to avoid it. 
 Most managers revealed  an inherent 
interest in fairness and trust reciprocity. 
What was their motive? These 
managers received no material pay-off 
or other benefit for trying to unravel the 
noisy metric of aggregate performance. 
Quite the opposite: acquiring additional 
information came at a personal price. 
How can we explain this?
 Numerous empirical studies have 
revealed a strong preference for 
fairness in humans and a willingness 
to incur personal cost to achieve it. Our 
study confirms that this preference also 
plays an important role in the decision-
making process of managers. In fact, 
even when there is only a potential for 
unfairness (and not certain unfairness), 
these managers were willing to 
sacrifice personal wealth in order to 
bring about a fairer result.
 Like fairness, trust reciprocity has 
been identified in studies as a driving 
human concern. In our study, we found 
that managers were more willing to 
obtain information on individual effort 
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a powerful basis for companies to 
consider including more subjective 
input from managers into the decision-
making process as an effective 
means of remedying the very real 
shortcomings of purely data-driven 
performance measures.
 Another implication relates to 
efficiency. Many managers with 
strong social preferences for fairness 
are likely to invest considerable time 
and energy in acquiring additional 
information to subsidise the 
perceived inadequacy of standardised 
performance reports – regardless of 
the policy of the company.
 Companies could thus do well 
to facilitate this investigation by 
making data more readily available, 
such as via more flexible accounting 
systems that cater for user-driven ad 
hoc exploration of data beyond that 
routinely produced by accounting 
reports. This would improve the 
efficiency in which managers’ can 
acquire their information and thus 
reduce the cost of time spent on 
these activities.
 These changes could be 
immensely beneficial if they serve to 
structure incentives and rewards more 
appropriately. Indeed, what could be 
more important in a market economy 
than the performance incentives 
we provide for employees, managers 
and investors? 
levels when the teams performed 
relatively well (but still within the 
“noisy” average range). Why? When 
employees chose to invest effort 
in their work, it conveyed trust to 
managers that this effort would 
be recognised and rewarded. This 
perceived trust was reciprocated by 
managers in the form of greater time 
and money spent ensuring these 
expectations were met, thus revealing 
trust reciprocity as a motivating factor 
in their behaviour.
 Clearly, managers have strong 
preferences other than that of 
wealth maximisation, self-interest 
and cognitive bias influencing the 
decisions they make. In this instance, 
we could view their decisions as a 
trade-off between the potential risk 
of unfairness, the degree of trust 
reciprocity present, and the personal 
cost of acquiring the extra information.
 Companies could do with 
integrating subjective input into the 
evaluation process. But how can this 
information be of use to companies?
 One important implication concerns 
how companies can achieve a more 
optimal process for determining the 
appropriate incentive compensation 
plan for a particular employee. 
More research needs to be done 
into the interplay of managerial 
preferences. But the evidence of 
strong, non-selfish motives provides 
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